Trustees’ investment duties and cryptoassets by TANG, Hang Wu
Singapore Management University 
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 
Research Collection School Of Law School of Law 
1-2020 
Trustees’ investment duties and cryptoassets 
Hang Wu TANG 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research 
 Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons 
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Institutional Knowledge at 
Singapore Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Law by an 
authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, 
please email cherylds@smu.edu.sg. 
In depth
Trustees’ investment duties and cryptoassets
TangHangWu*
Abstract
This article considers the legal and practical con-
cerns for trustees regarding cryptocurrencies and
other related instruments, which will be referred
to as ‘‘cryptoassets’’. It will briefly introduce the
various types of cryptoassets and explore the risks
involved when trustees decide to (or not to) invest
in these instruments. This article provides a
framework on how trustees should approach the
issue of cryptoassets.
Introduction
Cryptoassets have been touted as a potentially dis-
rupting force which will forever change the world of
finance, banking and various other industries. While
some of these claims are certainly overhyped,1 trustees
who oversee large trust funds should be thinking and
formulating policies in relation to cryptoassets even if
they ultimately decide not to invest in them. Prima
facie, the topic of trustees’ investment duties and
cryptoassets might seem like an oxymoron. Trustees
are supposed to act like an ordinary prudent person
acting for people for whom they feel morally bound
to provide.2 How then can an ordinary prudent
person invest in cryptoassets bearing in mind its
well-known risky nature? This article does not take
the position that trustees should necessarily invest in
cryptoassets. But the argument advanced here is that
trustees should familiarise themselves with the broad
nature of cryptoassets and consider their investment
duties in relation to cryptoassets. This is especially
acute for trustees operating in jurisdictions like the
Cayman Islands, British Virgin Islands and Singapore
where billions of dollars of investments have been
poured into cryptoassets. A 2018 PWC report states
that Initial Coin Offerings (ICO),3 a form of cryptoas-
set, have raised USD 4 billion in Cayman Islands,
USD 2 billion in British Virgin Islands and USD 1
billion in Singapore.4 Thus, in these jurisdictions,
cryptoassets are a form of potential investment
which is readily available in the market and not just
a faraway theoretical concept. Even if trustees ultim-
ately take the position not to invest in cryptoassets,
such a choice should be reached via a considered de-
cision based on their legal duties. Otherwise, benefi-
ciaries of trusts may allege that the trustees have
* Tang Hang Wu, Professor and Director, School of Law, Centre for Cross-Border Commercial Law in Asia, Singapore Management University. I am grateful
to Yao Qinzhe for invaluable research assistance and Alvin See and Kelvin Low for discussing some of these issues with me. I would also thank David Chong,
Valerie Wu, Chan Ee Lin, Sim Bock Eng and Nicholas Jacob for persuading me to explore and speak about this topic at seminars organised by the Singapore
Trustees Association, STEP Singapore and Private Client Forum Asia.
1. Cf. KFK Low & E Mik, ‘‘Pause the Blockchain Revolution’’ (2019) ICLQ forthcoming for a sceptical view.
2. Re Whiteley (1886) 33 Ch D 347 at 355.
3. On ICO see DA Zetzsche, RP Buckley, DW Arner, & L Föhr, ‘‘The ICO Gold Rush: It’s a Scam, It’s a Bubble, It’s a Super Challenge for Regulators’’ (24 July
2018) University of Luxembourg Law Working Paper No. 11/2017; UNSW Law Research Paper No. 17-83; University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law Research Paper
No. 2017/035; European Banking Institute Working Paper Series 18/2018; Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 63, No. 2, 2019. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.
com/abstract¼3072298 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3072298.
4. PWC, ‘‘Initial Coin Offerings: A Strategic Perspective’’ (June 2018). Available at https://www.pwc.ch/en/publications/2018/20180628_
PwC%20S&%20CVA%20ICO%20Report_EN.pdf. However, the exuberance in relation to ICOs have died down recently.
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breached their duties by missing out on numerous
profit opportunities and not growing the trust
fund.5 The issue of investing in cryptoassets may
also arise if a number of beneficiaries request the
trustees to invest in cryptoassets. Or it could arise
in a trust where the investment power was reserved
by the settlor and the settlor directs the trustee to
invest in cryptoassets. In these circumstances, the
trustees would have to grapple with the law of trus-
tees’ investment duties in relation to cryptoassets.
This article considers the legal and practical con-
cerns for trustees regarding cryptocurrencies and
other related instruments, which will be referred to
as ‘‘cryptoassets’’. It will briefly introduce the various
types of cryptoassets and explore the risks involved
when trustees decide to (or not to) invest in these
instruments. This article provides a framework
on how trustees should approach the issue of
cryptoassets.
Thisarticle doesnottake the positionthattrus-
tees should necessarily invest in cryptoassets.
But the argument advanced here is that trus-
tees should familiarise themselves with the
broad nature of cryptoassets and consider
their investment duties in relation to
cryptoassets
Ashort introduction to cryptoassets
A ‘‘cryptoasset’’ is one of the umbrella terms for the
innovative instruments which encompass the well-
known cryptocurrencies including Bitcoin and
Ethereum all the way down to a digital token to pur-
chase. A cryptoasset is built out of a digital ledger
technology.6 This is a category of technologies
which enable decentralised synchronisation of data
across a number of machines, without the need for
a centralised master data source. The most well-
known of such technologies is the blockchain; each
new ‘‘block’’ of data encodes data about the previous
block, and so the entire chain of data is theoretically
protected from error or alteration. Among other
things, this chain of data can store information such
as ‘‘tokens’’—units of assigned value—which can be
tied to an ‘‘address’’. A user can access tokens in a
blockchain address assigned to them through a ‘‘pri-
vate key’’—essentially a password, and transfer tokens
to other addresses. Hence, it is theoretically possible
for such tokens to take on the function which would
traditionally be taken on by a national currency; it is
touted by supporters as being more secure, confiden-
tial and efficient.
There is no agreed definition for what qualifies as a
cryptoasset, and how cryptoassets are classified. The
United Kingdom’s Financial Conduct Authority, for
example, uses the following definition:
. . . generally, cryptoassets are a cryptographically
secured digital representation of value or contractual
rights that is powered by forms of [Digital Ledger
Technology] and can be stored, transferred or traded
electronically . . .7
That is, a ‘‘digital ledger technology’’, e.g. a block-
chain, is the basis for a virtual token, e.g. Ethereum,
which is meant to have some general or specific
purpose.
The United Kingdom’s Financial Conduct
Authority8 classifies cryptoassets as follows: ‘‘ex-
change tokens’’, which are similar in function to a
currency and are meant to be used as a medium of
exchange; ‘‘security tokens’’, which resemble securi-
ties similar to shares or debt instruments; and ‘‘utility
tokens’’, where the tokens are essentially coupons
5. See e.g. Nestlé v National Westminister Bank plc [1993] 1 WLR 1260.
6. S Nakomoto, ‘Bitcoin: A Peer-To-Peer Electronic Cash System’’ (2008) 1. Available at https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf. See also S Green, ‘‘Cryptocurrencies:
The Underlying Technology’’ in Cryptocurrencies in Public and Private Law (D Fox & S Green, eds), (OUP, 2019) Ch 1; SJ Hughes & Stephen Middlebrook,
‘‘Advancing a Framework for Regulating Cryptocurrency Payments Intermediaries’’ (2015) 32 Yale Journal on Regulation 495, 504–505.
7. Financial Conduct Authority, ‘‘Guidance on Cryptoassets’’ Consultation Paper, CP 19/3 (January 2019). Available at https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/
consultation/cp19-03.pdf.
8. Ibid at 2.5.
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used to purchase specific (digital) goods or services.
However, these categories might not be neat cate-
gories as it may be possible for certain instruments
to be ‘‘hybrid tokens’’ as they may fulfil more than the
requirements of one of the categories described. In
fact, this three-fold categorisation is not universal.
The University of Cambridge Centre for Alternative
Finance, for example, highlights that this classification
may not cover all forms of cryptoassets and has sug-
gested a more nuanced and multi-dimensional ap-
proach towards classification.9 For the purpose of
this article, the common regulatory approach of ‘‘ex-
change, security, utility’’ will be used; however, there
may be more nuance required when it comes to
‘‘hybrid tokens’’, or categories of cryptoassets which
may fall outside all three.
Exchange tokens: cryptoassets as medium of
exchange
A number of tokens attempt to position themselves as
a medium of exchange. These tokens will be referred
to as ‘‘cryptocurrencies’’ or ‘‘exchange tokens’’. A fur-
ther distinction should be made between cryptocur-
rencies which have the primary function of a currency
replacement and are platform-independent, e.g.
Bitcoin, and cryptocurrencies which are the basis for
transactions on particular platforms, e.g. Ether (on
the Ethereum network), which is meant to facilitate
‘‘smart contracts’’, theoretically self-executing substi-
tutes for the enforcement mechanisms of contract
law.
The baseline for comparison for cryptocurrencies in
their function as currency substitutes, as represented
by Bitcoin, is the national currency in a stable econ-
omy. Persons in that economy are willing to hold
cash, or bank balances denominated in that currency.
An offer of cash must legally be accepted as payment
for debt, and is willingly accepted in exchange for
goods and service. It is, in the words of the Oxford
English Dictionary, ‘‘A system of money in general use
in a particular country.’’
At present, however, cryptocurrencies do not
appear to function well as currency. In a speech on
2 March 2018, the governor of the Bank of England,
Mark Carney, described cryptocurrencies as ‘‘failing’’
in this function.10 He identified three major problems
with cryptocurrencies as currency: First, a cryptocur-
rency is a poor store of value due to extreme volatility.
Most have no intrinsic value. Secondly, cryptocurren-
cies are a poor medium of exchange. The fact that
users must pay fees for transactions to be processed
speedily seriously diminishes their value as a currency;
in contrast, an exchange of banknotes has zero trans-
action fees and is instantaneous. Thirdly, cryptocur-
rencies are not used as units of account, in part due to
the first two problems.
In part to mitigate some of these issues, the ‘‘sta-
blecoin’’ has attracted attention in recent months.
This is a token which is backed by a pool of other
assets in order to minimise volatility in the price of
that token. Facebook’s proposed Libra is an example
of this; the value of Libra is to be backed by short-
term government securities and bank deposits in na-
tional currencies.11 Stablecoins are envisaged to be
convertible into national currencies through centra-
lised exchanges, unlike the diverse exchanges (with
potential fraud risks) with other tokens in this cat-
egory. However, the potential money laundering and
regulatory risks involved with such a project have at-
tracted regulatory disapproval.12 Even some states
have floated the idea of creating asset-backed crypto-
currencies for these advantages. For example,
Venezuela has purported to launch a cryptocurrency
backed by its commodities production and reserves to
mitigate the effects of the ongoing economic crisis
9. A Blandin et al, ‘‘Global Cryptoasset Regulatory Landscape Study’’ (16 April 2019). University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 23/2019.
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract¼3379219 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3379219.
10. M Carney, ‘‘The Future of Money’’ Speech Given to the Inaugural Scottish Economics Conference, Edinburgh University (2 March 2018). Available at
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2018/mark-carney-speech-to-the-inaugural-scottish-economics-conference.
11. Libra Association Members, Libra Whitepaper. Available at https://libra.org/en-US/wp-content/uploads/sites/23/2019/06/LibraWhitePaper_en_US.pdf
12. L Frost, ‘‘France and Germany Agree to Block Facebook’s Libra’’ Reuters (13 September 2019). Available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-
cryptocurrency-france-german/france-and-germany-agree-to-block-facebooks-libra-idUSKCN1VY1XU.
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and hyperinflation, though these tokens do not
appear to be trading and have been described as a
failure.13
The second category of cryptocurrencies, as rep-
resented by Ether, function as the medium of ex-
change for smart contracts. A smart contract is
essentially a computer program (which will often
be associated with a digital ledger/blockchain)
which facilitates a contract. The Ethereum block-
chain, which distributes the Ether token, is itself a
platform for such software applications, and the
Ether tokens can be used to fulfil obligations
under the smart contract and/or pay for computa-
tion time.
Security tokens: cryptoassets as securities
Another form of cryptoasset is what has been
broadly termed ‘‘security tokens’’. These are
tokens which have similar functions to a financial
security, e.g. a share in the company issuing the
cryptoasset, or proof of a loan, and are largely regu-
lated in similar (if not the same) manner. For ex-
ample, the Monetary Authority of Singapore
requires any digital token which falls within the def-
inition of a ‘‘capital markets product’’ as defined in
legislation to comply with existing securities regu-
lation rules.14 The value of such a token is its func-
tion as an investment product. The holder of such a
token may have a right to demand repayment of a
specified sum of money from the company, or to
receive dividends.
Utility tokens: cryptoassets as coupons
A utility token is essentially pre-payment for a service.
Such tokens permit holders to access a particular ser-
vice, which is usually distributed and decentralised in
some way. For example, a file storage service could
operate as follows:
 Persons with data storage available offer their free
space.
 Tokens are generated and sold to persons (the
‘‘Initial Coin Offering’’).
 These tokens are traded (perhaps for national cur-
rencies or other cryptoassets) until a person who
wishes to use data storage uses the token to access
the service.
 The token is paid to the person providing the file
storage.
 The person providing the file storage sells the token
on.
The value of the token is essentially the value of the
service which the token is to be exchanged for, and in
theory, is tradeable for other tokens or national cur-
rencies based on that valuation.
Apreliminaryquestion: what is the
legal nature of a cryptoasset?
A preliminary question that is often asked is this:
what is the legal nature of a cryptoasset? Is cryptoasset
a form of property in law? More specifically, if a
cryptoasset is not legally considered to be a form of
property, then does it mean trustees must necessarily
be precluded from investing in cryptoassets? The issue
whether a cryptoasset is considered to be property is
presently a contested question in the legal world and
this article does not propose to resolve the debate.
Ultimately, whether cryptoassets are regarded as
property may differ from one jurisdiction to the
next. However, it is this author’s contention that
that the correct question to be asked is not whether
cryptoassets are a form of property but whether the
trust deed permits an investment in cryptoassets. If
this is the correct analysis, then the issue of whether a
cryptoasset is a form of property is a red herring, at
least in this context. In this section, the author will
outline the current controversy in relation to this
13. A Brown, ‘‘Venezuela’s Failed Cryptocurrency Is the Future of Money’’ Bloomberg (10 May 2019). Available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2019-05-10/venezuela-s-failed-cryptocurrency-is-the-future-of-money.
14. Monetary Authority of Singapore, A Guide to Digital Token Offerings (5 April 2019). Available at https://www.mas.gov.sg/-/media/MAS/Regulations-and-
Financial-Stability/Regulations-Guidance-and-Licensing/Guide-to-Digital-Tokens-Offering-last-updated-on-5-April-2019.pdf
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issue and develop the argument that this thorny ques-
tion is not relevant in terms of the trustees’ invest-
ment powers if the trust deed specifically permits the
investment in cryptoassets.
Is cryptoasset a form of property in law? More
specifically, if a cryptoasset is not legally con-
sidered to be a form of property, then does it
mean trustees must necessarily be precluded
frominvesting in cryptoassets?
There are several excellent academic works dealing
with the issue whether a cryptoasset should be re-
garded as property.15 The main problem with char-
acterising cryptoassets as a form of personal property
is that it does not fit within the classic definition of
personal property which comprises choses in posses-
sion or choses in action.16 As Professor Fox explains
perceptively:
It is easy to explain why cryptocurrencies cannot be
characterized as choses in possession. The data strings
comprising the coins are intangible and cannot be
physically possessed. The coins consisting in an un-
spent transactional output are just an ideational entity
. . . Neither are cyber-currencies choses in action. This
follows from the defining differences between cyber-
currencies recorded on a distributed ledger and the
conventional currencies that depend on the existence
of centralized intermediaries.17
Thus, in order for cryptoassets to be regarded as a
form of property in law, the courts must be prepared
to recognise a third category of property, one which is
neither strictly a chose in action or a chose in posses-
sion.18 There are hints from cases in Canada and
Singapore that this might happen in the
Commonwealth courts. In Copytrack Pte Ltd v
Wall,19 the British Columbia Supreme Court allowed
a claim for cryptocurrency to be traced. Such a hold-
ing implies that cryptocurrencies are regarded as a
form of property. Similarly, in B2C2 Ltd v Quoine
Pte Ltd,20 a case in the Singapore International
Commercial Court, it was argued that a breach of
trust had occurred regarding Bitcoins. This argument
was accepted by the judge Simon Thorley IJ who
observed:
Quoine was prepared to assume that cryptocurren-
cies may be treated as property that may be held on
trust. I consider that it was right to do so.
Cryptocurrencies are not legal tender in the sense
of being a regulated currency issued by a government
but do have the fundamental characteristic of intan-
gible property as being an identifiable thing of value.
Quoine drew my attention to the classic definition of
a property right in the House of Lords decision of
National Provincial Bank v Ainsworth [1965] 1 AC
1175 at 1248:
‘‘it must be definable, identifiable by third parties,
capable in its nature of assumption by third parties,
and have some degree of permanence or stability’’.
Cryptocurrencies meet all these requirements.
While both these cases do not definitively establish
that cryptoassets are regarded as property in law,
they certainly hint at the direction which common
15. See e.g. KFK Low & EGS Teo, ‘‘Bitcoins and Other Cryptocurrencies as Property’’ (2017) 9 Law, Innovation & Technology 235; D Fox, ‘‘Cryptocurrencies in
the Common Law of Property’’ in Cryptocurrencies in Public and Private Law (D Fox & S Green, eds), (OUP, 2019) Ch 6; M Solinas, ‘‘Bitcoiners in Wonderland:
Lessons from the Cheshire Cat’’ [2019] LMCLQ 434 at 439; J Sarra & L Gullifer, ‘‘Crypto-claimants and Bitcoin Bankruptcy: Challenges for Recognition and
Realization’’ (2019) 28 International Insolvency Review 233.
16. Colonial Bank v Whinney (1885) LR 30 Ch 261 at 285 – 286, adopted (1886) LR 11 App Cas 426.
17. D Fox, ‘‘Cryptocurrencies in the Common Law of Property’’ in Cryptocurrencies in Public and Private Law (D Fox & S Green, eds), (OUP, 2019) 149.
18. See Sir Geoffrey Vos, ‘‘Cryptoassets as Property: How Can English Law Boost the Confidence of World-
Be Parties to Smart Legal Contracts’’, a speech delivered at the Joint Northern Chancery Bar at Association and University of Liverpool Lecture (2 May 2019) at
[53].
19. 2018 BCSC 1709.
20. [2019] SGHC(I) 03 at [142]. This decision is currently under on appeal. In this case, it is by no means clear whether the trust over cryptoassets exists in the
present facts due to the contested issue of certainty of intention to create a trust.
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law courts are likely to take. It may be more difficult
to make the argument that cryptoassets are property
in the civil law world. In 2015, an attempt was made
by users of a bankrupt Japanese Bitcoin exchange,
Mt. Gox, to argue that the remaining bitcoins were
legally their property. However, the Japanese court
rejected this argument, ruling that bitcoins are not
regarded as property under the Japanese Civil
Code.21
The argument advanced in this article is that the
issue whether cryptoassets are regarded as property
may be addressed by drafting the trustees’ investment
powers to allow for such investments. The starting
point is that a trustee usually hold general powers
of investment. Section 3(1) of the English Trustee
Act,22 for example, provides that a trustee ‘‘may
make any kind of investment that he could make if
he were absolutely entitled to the assets of the trust’’.
A similar power is found in section 24 of the Trusts
(Jersey) Law 1984: ‘‘Subject to the terms of the trust
and subject to the trustee’s duties under this Law, a
trustee shall in relation to the trust property have all
the same powers as a natural person acting as the
beneficial owner of such property.’’ The statute does
not define the term ‘‘investment’’. While an argument
may be made that this power of investment does not
mean that trustees are permitted to only invest in
things that are regarded as property in law, there
are parts in the judgment of Re Wragg23 which
contradict this position. Lawrence J observed in Re
Wragg:24
Without attempting to give an exhaustive definition of
the words ‘‘invest’’ and ‘‘investment’’ I think that the
verb ‘‘to invest’’ when used in an investment clause
may safely be said to include as one of its meanings
‘‘to apply money in the purchase of some property
from which interest or profit is expected and which
property is purchased in order to be held for the sake
of the income which it will yield’’; whilst the noun
‘‘investment’’ when used in such a clause may safely
be said to include as one of its meanings ‘‘the property
in the purchase of which the money has been so
applied.’’
The argument advanced in this article is that
the issue whethercryptoassets are regarded as
property may be addressed by drafting the
trustees’ investment powers to allow for such
investments
The passage above refers to investment in the context
of ‘‘purchase of some property’’. Prima facie, this part
of the judgment supports the view that trustees are
only entitled to invest in things that are considered
property. However, Lawrence J was careful to say that
this was not an exhaustive definition. Thus, for set-
tlors who wish for their trustees to have the power to
invest in cryptoassets, it would be advisable to provide
for the trust deed to explicitly allow for investments in
cryptoassets regardless whether they are considered to
be property or not in law. In order to do so, the trust
deed must also allow the trustees to invest in assets
which have the potential to appreciate in capital value
but does not produce any income. This is because
cryptoassets are unlikely to produce income and usu-
ally bought for capital appreciation.
Even if trustees are given the power to invest in
cryptoassets, this does not mean that they should
invest in cryptoassets. Any investments in cryptoas-
sets ought to be made with careful consideration of
their usual duties as trustees. In other words, any
investment in cryptoassets will be subject to all the
usual duties that a trustee has when investing, e.g.
portfolio suitability and diversification and ensuring
that any appointed investment managers are suitable.
21. The English translation of the judgment is available at https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/oxlaw/mtgox_judgment_final.pdf.
22. Trustees Act 2000. Singapore has a similar provision. See section 4(1) of the Trustees Act (Cap 337, 2005 Rev Edn).
23. [1919] 2 Ch 58.
24. [1919] 2 Ch 58 at 64–65.
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These duties will be explored in a later part of this
article.
Should settlors permit or prohibit
investments in cryptoassets?
In light of the uncertainty surrounding the property
issue, those who draft trust deeds should have a ser-
ious conversation with intended settlors as to whether
their trust deeds should explicitly permit or prohibit
investments into cryptoassets. For intended settlors
who wish for their trustees to have the power to
invest in cryptoassets, the trust deed should contain
provisions explicitly providing for such an avenue of
investment. A clause permitting investments in cryp-
toassets should make it clear that these investments
are allowed notwithstanding the legal uncertainty
whether cryptoassets are regarded as a form of prop-
erty or not. Properly drafted, such a clause should
arguably render the property debate otiose in the con-
text of trustees’ power to invest in cryptoassets.
However, until we have a definitive ruling from the
courts, there is some legal risk that the courts may still
regard cryptoassets as an unauthorised investment
notwithstanding such a clause.
For unadventurous settlors, should those who draft
trust deeds advise them to take the conservative ap-
proach and prohibit all investments in cryptoassets?
While cryptoassets might be seen as a risky venture
today, it could become commonplace in the future.
As Streisand and Rees observe:
The authors believe that cryptos and blockchain even-
tually will be akin to other forms of new technologies
and investments that became a part of our daily lives,
and could no longer be brushed aside as only for
geeks, or at least only something our kids could
grasp . . . Soon, people will be investing indirectly in
cryptos and blockchains as more hedge funds and
companies take the plunge. In relatively short order,
we believe investment managers will recommend
cryptos due to the untapped growth potential in the
same that it became difficult to avoid tech stocks
during their boom as part of a diversified portfolio.25
In future, cryptoassets could become a commonplace
investment with less risk associated. Thus, it is the
present author’s view that it might be unwise to ex-
clude all investments in cryptoassets as this will un-
necessarily restrict the trustees’ future actions
especially if the trust is envisaged to last for a long
time.
In future, cryptoassets could become a com-
monplace investment with less risk associated.
Thus, it is the present author’s view that it
might be unwise to exclude all investments in
cryptoassets as this will unnecessarily restrict
the trustees’ future actions especially if the
trust is envisaged to last fora long time
Trustees’ investment duties and
cryptoassets
Assuming that cryptoassets are legitimate investments
in which a trustee is permitted to invest under the
trust deed, this brings us back to the question that this
article started with: What should a trustee think about
when considering any investments in cryptoassets? As
a starting principle, trustees are expected to act with
diligence and care as an ordinary prudent person of
business would exercise in the management of their
affairs.26 Alternatively, a trustee’s duties are some-
times stated as the standard an ordinary prudent
person would adopt for the benefit of other people
he or she felt morally bound to provide.27 For pro-
fessional trustees, a higher standard of care is expected
i.e. such professional trustees are judged in relation to
‘‘any special knowledge or experience that it is
25. See AF Streisand & JD Rees, ‘‘Cryptocurrencies and Trustees Duties to Invest Prudently: Navigating Fiduciary Duties in the Age of Decentralization’’ (2018)
24(3) California Trusts and Estates Quarterly 11 at 17.
26. Speight v Gaunt (1883) App Cas 1.
27. Re Whiteley (1886) 33 Ch D 347 at 355.
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reasonable to expect of a person acting in the course
of that kind of business or profession’’.28
How should professional trustees approach cryp-
toassets? Streisand & Rees wisely recommend the fol-
lowing approach:
At a minimum, a trustee must demonstrate, and
preferably document, a cogent, prudent thought
process that led to the ultimate investment deci-
sion. The trustee should be able to explain how
the decision to invest in blockchain technology
generally was a wise choice, and why the particular
crypto or other assets invested in were sensible
options.29
In formulating a cogent and prudent thought process,
it is suggested that the following framework might be
useful for trustees contemplating investments in
cryptoassets:
 How would a reasonable professional trustee view
cryptoassets as an investment?
 Are investments into cryptoassets consistent with
the purposes, terms and circumstances of the trust?
 Can cryptoassets be accommodated within the
modern portfolio theory?
 How should a proper assessment of the particular
cryptoasset be conducted?
 What is the trustees’ scope of responsibility if a
settlor directs the trustee to invest in cryptoassets
pursuant to a reserved power of investment or if a
company owned by the trust invests in
cryptoassets?
 What is the correct approach if some of the
beneficiaries request the trustees to invest
cryptoassets?
 What are the steps the trustees should take to
ensure that the cryptoassets are in proper custody?
 Are the pre-existing exclusion clauses in the trust
deed sufficient to protect trustees who invest in
cryptoassets?
In the sections below, some of these questions will be
explored.
How would a reasonable professional trustee
viewcryptoassets as an investment?
At this point in time, it is fair to say that investment
into cryptoassets is a risky business. Cryptoassets are
subject to hacking risk, ‘theft’ or loss of private keys
and volatile change in value.30 Given all these risks,
cryptoassets may be seen as a form of hazardous in-
vestments. Thus, trustees may legitimately take the
position that currently it may be too risky to invest
directly in cryptoassets. This is consistent with the
trustees’ duty not to invest in hazardous invest-
ments.31 Therefore, trustees are prima facie not
entitled to invest in cryptoassets unless there are spe-
cific clauses permitting them to invest in cryptoassets
and hazardous investments. As Christopher McCall
QC, writing in this journal, observed perceptively:
there are two questions which any trustee has to ad-
dress in considering whether an investment is a proper
investment; he has to consider first the scope of his
powers and then as a separate matter the question
whether assuming they have sufficient scope to
permit the transaction in question it is proper to
effect that transaction.32
Given all these risks, cryptoassetsmaybe seen
asa formofhazardousinvestments.Thus, trus-
tees may legitimately take the position that
currently it may be too risky to invest directly
in cryptoassets
28. Section 1(1) Trustees Act 2000. See also Re Waterman’s Will Trust [1952] 2 All ER 1054.
29. AF Streisand & JD Rees, ‘‘Cryptocurrencies and Trustees Duties to Invest Prudently: Navigating Fiduciary Duties in the Age of Decentralization’’ (2018)
24(3) California Trusts and Estates Quarterly 11 at 18.
30. KFK Low & E Teo, ‘‘Legal Risk of Owning Cryptocurrencies’’ in Handbook of Blockchain, Digital Finance and Inclusion (D Lee & R Deng, eds), (Elsevier,
2017) 225.
31. Learoyd v Whiteley (1887) 12 App Cas 727; Bartlett v Barclays Bank Trust Co Ltd [1980] Ch 515.
32. C McCall QC, ‘‘A Fine Romance—The Union of Prudence and Risk’’ (2009) 15(2) Trusts & Trustees 60 at 63.
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Thus, to invest in cryptoassets, trustees must ensure
that the trust deed permits an investment in cryptoas-
set and hazardous investments. However, even if there
are clauses in the trust deed specifically permitting for
investments in cryptoassets and allowing for hazard-
ous investments, trustees must then carefully consider
the purposes, terms and circumstances of the trust
before making such investments. It is to this issue
that this article now turns.
Are investments in cryptoassets consistent with
the purposes, terms and circumstances of the
trust? Can cryptoassets be accommodated
within the modern portfolio theory?
The trustees must consider the present and future
beneficiaries and the size of the trust fund to deter-
mine whether cryptoassets are indeed suitable invest-
ments. As Sir Robert Megarry VC observed in Cowan
v. Scargill:
The starting point is the duty of trustees to exercise
their powers in the best interests of the present and
future beneficiaries of the trust . . . When the purpose
of the trust is to provide financial benefits for the
beneficiaries, as is usually the case, the best interests
of the beneficiaries are normally their best financial
interests. In the case of a power of investment . . .
the power must be exercised so as to yield the best
return for the beneficiaries, judged in relation to the
risks of the investments in question . . . 33
Thus, if the trust fund is modest in quantum and the
trust is required to maintain a stable source of income
for the current beneficiaries without much need for
growth, it may not be prudent for trustees to invest in
cryptoassets. Investments into cryptoassets may only
arguably be justified if the trust portfolio is very large
and risk is considered to be acceptable in light of the
entire portfolio. As Hoffmann J (as he then was) said
in Nestlé v. National Westminster Bank plc34 that an
investment is ‘‘to be judged by the standard of current
portfolio theory, which emphasises the risk level of
the entire portfolio rather than the risk attaching to
each investment taken in isolation’’. More recently,
the Privy Council in Dominica Social Security Board
v Nature Island Investment Company observed:
[T]he law recognises that when very large investment
funds are available, the degree of risk acceptable to
fiduciaries should to some extent be judged by refer-
ence to the entirety of the holdings in a diversified
portfolio, rather than by reference to individual
holdings.35
In a large portfolio of investments, trustees may be
justified in putting a small percentage of the invest-
ments in speculative investments like cryptoassets.
How should trustees do a proper assessment of
the cryptoasset?
Even if the circumstances of the trust and size of the
portfolio justify investments in cryptoassets, the trus-
tees must undertake the task of assessing whether the
cryptoasset in question is in fact a prudent invest-
ment. The following questions need to be considered.
Is this type of cryptoasset suitable in the first place?
Which investment manager or expert on cryptoasset
should the trustee consult? Is this an appropriate risk-
to-reward ratio? Cryptoassets have their own specific
risks and a number of these risks are considered
below.
It is far more likely that trustees will either purchase
tokens off a platform, or participate in an ICO.
Trustees should be cognisant of the fact that ICO
being essentially a start-up is statistically likely to
fail. Trading tokens on a platform also carries its
risks. Platform insolvencies carry the risk that the
entire investment will be lost. The Mt. Gox bank-
ruptcy in Japan demonstrates the importance of the
legal domicile of the platform; under Japanese law,
33. [1985] Ch. 270 at 286–287.
34. [1988] (1996) 10(1) Trust Law International 113 at 115.
35. [2008] UKPC 19 at [31].
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investors could not assert proprietary rights in the
remaining cryptoassets.36
Exchange tokens also carry its own unique risks.
The primary concern that trustees should have re-
garding investing in exchange tokens is their potential
convertibility into national currencies. Exchange
tokens are often illiquid and hence are difficult to
convert into national currencies. Trading them for
other tokens is relatively straightforward, but conver-
sion back into a national currency may not be pos-
sible on a given trading platform, or may entail long
wait times as the platform will rarely have enough
cash to satisfy all persons who want to redeem.
Stablecoins, which are linked to fiat currency or
assets, may help mitigate this issue, but it is still too
soon to tell if stablecoins will succeed given the sig-
nificant regulatory challenges due to anti-money
laundering concerns.
In terms of security tokens, these are functionally
securities, and often will be regulated as securities.
They can be treated as shares in a fund, or a loan,
as appropriate; similar principles will apply. But one
thing that trustees should consider is how any divi-
dends or repayments will be made and what other
rights are associated with the token—will they be
paid in a national currency, or in other cryptoassets?
Are they linked with an equity stake? All these will
have an impact on the suitability of the token as an
investment. Finally, in relation to utility tokens, these
tokens allow one to access a service in the future.
Trustees would have to tackle the following questions.
What is the projected future demand for the service?
How liquid is the market? Is the counterparty trust-
worthy? The investor is buying the hope that the ser-
vice will be developed, and will be popular. This, quite
obviously, carries additional risks as compared to
commodity futures trading in a mature market, e.g.
buying a future right to a barrel of oil.
Rees and Streisand suggest that a deep-dive on a
particular cryptoasset investment being considered
needs to be undertaken.37 They propose that in eval-
uating an investment, the trustees need to consider
inter alia the following questions: (a) What is the
problem the cryptoasset is addressing?; (b) What is
the proposed solution to the problem?; (c) Who is on
the management team?; (d) How large is the market?;
(e) Are there any existing competitors? (f) What is the
business plan?; (g) How will investors see a return on
investments? (h) How transparent is the management
team?; and (i) How likely is the product to achieve
critical mass? All these are certainly sensible questions
in evaluating an investment into cryptoassets.
Settlor directing trustees to invest in
cryptoassets or a wholly owned company
owned by the trust investing in cryptoassets
Thorny issues may arise where there is a settlor
reserved power of investment and the settlor directs
the trustee to invest in cryptoassets. Should the trus-
tees override the settlor’s direction in appropriate cir-
cumstances or are the trustees absolved from all
liability by following the settlor’ direction? The trus-
tees’ liability in this context would depend on the law
governing the trust. In some jurisdictions, trustees are
not liable if they act in accordance with the exercise of
the reserved power of investment.38 However, in
other jurisdictions, the legislation is not clear whether
there is a residuary duty of supervision in the context
of the settlor’s reserved power of investment.39 If such
36. See generally J Sarra & L Gullifer, ‘‘Crypto-claimants and Bitcoin Bankruptcy: Challenges for Recognition and Realization’’ (2019) 28 International Insolvency
Review 233.
37. AF Streisand & JD Rees, ‘‘Cryptocurrencies and Trustees Duties to Invest Prudently: Navigating Fiduciary Duties in the Age of Decentralization’’ (2018)
24(3) California Trusts and Estates Quarterly 11 at 20.
38. See e.g. section 41X of Hong Kong’s Trustee Ordinance (Cap 29).
39. See e.g. section 90(5) of Singapore’s Trustees Act (Cap 337, 2005 Rev Edn) which merely provides that a reservation of power of investment by the settlor
does not invalidate the trust. See also Re Duke of Northumberland, decd [1951] 1 Ch. 202 at 207 which suggests that the trustees have a residuary duty to consider
whether an investment is a prudent one.
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a duty of supervision exists, then it is incumbent on
the trustees to override the settlor’s directions if cryp-
toassets are not a suitable investment for the trust.
A similar problem may arise in the context of trust-
owned companies investing in cryptoassets.40 Most
trust deeds contain ‘anti-Bartlett’ clauses in relation to
shares of a company held on trust.41 ‘Anti-Bartlett’
clauses ostensibly allow the trustees not to interfere
with the management of the company even though
the trust holds the majority of the shareholding of the
company. What happens if the management of the com-
pany decides to invest in cryptoassets? Following the
recent decision of the Hong Kong Court of Appeal in
Zhang Hong Li v DBS Bank (Hong Kong) Ltd and
others,42 trustees may have a high-level supervisory
duty to override the management of the company, des-
pite an ‘anti-Bartlett’ clause and veto the investments
into cryptoassets. If trustees do not do so, they may be
in breach of this supervisory duty.
In terms of beneficiaries who request for trustees to
invest in cryptoassets, this is an easier issue to deal
with. As a general rule, a trustee is not bound to obey
the instructions of the beneficiaries in a discretionary
trust.43 It is unlikely that a trustee will be penalised for
being too cautious in this context even if the cryptoas-
set turned out to be extremely profitable. For the
trustees to be liable, the trustees must be shown to
have been negligent. A mere disagreement over in-
vestment strategy is likely not to be a form of
negligence.
What are the steps the trustees should take to
ensure that the trust assets are in proper
custody?
One of the fundamental duties of trustees is that they
should ensure that the trust assets are in proper
custody.44 In the context of cryptoassets, this concern
is especially acute since access and transfer of the
cryptoassets rely entirely on data strings which are
known as ‘private keys’. Once these ‘private keys’
are lost or stolen, access to the cryptoassets become
next to impossible. There are two well-known ex-
amples of loss of ‘‘private keys’’ resulting in a corres-
ponding loss of the cryptoassets. First, an Australian
man inadvertently threw away his hard drive contain-
ing the ‘private keys’ to his bitcoins which was worth
$80 million.45 Secondly, a co-founder of a cryptocur-
rency exchange tragically died unexpectedly, leaving
all his investors without access to the ‘‘private keys’’
to cryptoassets worth C$190 million.46
Hence, trustees who hold cryptoassets must be
careful that their ‘‘private keys’’ are held safely. If
the cryptoassets are on trading platforms, the selec-
tion of these platforms is critical—in the event of a
hack or a collapse, the trustee must be able to justify
why they originally chose that platform. The same
issue is present if the cryptoassets are held in a digital
‘‘wallet’’ on the cloud; if there is a hack, trustees must
be able to justify their decision. The custody of the
‘‘private keys’’ to cryptoassets must also be given a
serious thought. For example, if the ‘‘private keys’’
are written on a piece of paper, there is a risk of
loss or ‘‘theft’’ of the ‘‘private keys’’. Similarly, if the
‘‘private keys’’ are stored on a hard drive, there is the
risk of hacking. Since the peril of loss of the ‘‘private
keys’’ is an omnipresent danger, trustees should
engage reputable technical experts to advise them
on how to store the ‘‘private keys’’ to minimise
such risk. Ideally, the ‘‘private keys’’ should be
stored on ‘‘cold storage’’, i.e. kept in a form without
Internet connection to prevent hacking risk.
Additionally, the ‘‘private keys’’ should be accessible
by more than one person. Where possible, the trustees
40. On trust owned companies see M Yip, ‘Trust-owned Companies: Understanding the Trustee’s Duties’ (2017) 31 TLI 185.
41. These clauses are meant to overturn the effect of Bartlett v Barclays Bank Trust Co Ltd [1980] 2 WLR 430.
42. [2018] HKCA 435. The literature commenting on this case is voluminous. See e.g. the insightful analysis of T Graham and A Tan, ‘Prudence in Practice:
Bartlett and Beyond’ (2019) Trusts and Trustees forthcoming. Cf. R Davern, ‘Trustee Residual Obligation: Is There a Basis for It?’ (2019) 25(3) Trusts & Trustees 285.
See also Appleby Corporate Services (BVI) Ltd v Citco Trustees (BVI) Ltd [2016] WTLR 373.
43. X v A [2000] 1 All ER 490 at 496.
44. Re Miller’s Deed Trust (1978) 75 LS Gaz 454.
45. A Sulleyman, ‘‘Man Who ‘Threw Away’ Bitcoin Haul Now Worth over $80m Wants To Dig Up Landfill Site’’ The Independent, 4 December 2017.
46. ‘‘Quadriga Cryptocurrency Exchange Founder Filed Will 12 days Before He Died’ Bloomberg (6 February 2019).
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should also insure against the loss of the ‘‘private
keys’’.
Trustees’exemption clauses
Trustees who invest in cryptoassets should also review
their pre-existing exemption clauses in the trust deed
to ensure that their liability is limited. The standard
exemption clauses commonly found in trust deeds
should adequately deal with such situations e.g.
clauses exonerating the trustee from mistakes made
or losses incurred in good faith. Sweeping trustee ex-
emption clauses are already common in the profes-
sional trust industry and there should not be any need
to go further than standard templates.
Conclusion
This article has explored trustees’ investment duties in
relation to cryptoassets. While cryptoassets are cur-
rently much talked about, trustees should approach
investments in cryptoassets with extreme circumspec-
tion. Trustees who wish to invest in cryptoassets
should ensure that the trust deed permits such invest-
ments and the circumstances of the trust and size of
the trust portfolio justify such investment. In add-
ition, for brave trustees who venture into this space,
they would have to do the necessary due diligence in
relation to cryptoassets and ensure that technical ex-
perts are engaged to advise them on how the ‘‘private
keys’’ are to be kept.
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